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I. Introduction  
 
In December 1959, future Nobel laureate Ronald Coase took the floor at the Federal 
Communications Commission. “I appear before you,” he began, “with a strong conviction and a 
bold proposal. My conviction is that the principles under which the American economic system 
generally operates are fundamentally sound. My proposal is that [this agency] adopt those 
principles.”1  
 
Coase challenged the agency’s long-held assumption that a command-and-control system was 
the optimal regulatory model for the communications marketplace. He argued that the pricing 
system is a superior method to allocate the scarce resources under the agency’s control. If the 
agency properly defined property rights, a market-based regime would guide these resources to 
their highest and best use – just as it does with other scarce goods throughout the American 
economy. And market solutions would minimize the risks of inefficiency and political influence 
inherent in a system that distributes resources by administrative fiat. From this critique of the 
FCC, Coase would eventually develop the theorem that bears his name, earning himself a 
reputation among academics as one of the twentieth century’s most influential economists. But 
the FCC was not as impressed: Commissioner Philip Cross immediately asked Coase in 
seriousness, “Are you spoofing us? Is this all a big joke?”2 
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Yet it was Coase who had the last laugh. Slowly, with occasional nudges from Capitol Hill, the 
Commission began relaxing its Soviet-style control of telecom inputs and instead adopted 
market-oriented solutions. Perhaps most obviously, in 1997 the agency abandoned hearings and 
lotteries in favor of auctions as the primary mechanism to allocate spectrum licenses. More 
recently, the agency embraced reverse auctions as the optimal tool to distribute limited universal 
service buildout funds. 
 
This September, the agency is poised to take another small but momentous step in Ronald 
Coase’s direction. Among the nine seemingly mundane items on this month’s Open Meeting 
agenda is a proposal to modernize the system to assign toll-free numbers. The agency has 
proposed adopting a sealed-bid Vickrey auction for popular, contested numbers. It also envisions 
lifting the prohibition on selling toll-free numbers, which would allow trading of valuable 
numbers on secondary markets. This innovative proposal will enhance efficiency by quickly 
assigning popular numbers to those who value them most, while reducing the burden on the 
agency of administering the current command-and-control system. It will also raise revenue that 
can defray the costs of administering the number assignment process, thus shifting some of those 
costs to the toll-free number subscribers who benefit most from the service. 
 
II. Scarcity in the Toll-Free Number Regime 
 
Administration of the toll-free number regime is surprisingly complex. Since the breakup of the 
Bell system and the advent of number portability in 1993, the Commission has relied on 
approximately 350 Responsible Organizations (or “RespOrgs”) to distribute toll-free numbers to 
the public.3 RespOrgs act like registrars in the domain name system. Each has access to a master 
database of available toll-free numbers, which since 1998 have been made available on a first-
come, first-served basis to RespOrgs.4 A customer seeking a toll-free number enlists the services 
of a RespOrg, which secures the number for the customer and administers the appropriate 
records on the customer’s behalf. RespOrgs provide these services pursuant to a common tariff 
and follow specific Commission guidelines. 
 
This system creates incentives for strategic behavior, particularly with regard to desirable 
numbers like vanity numbers (such as “1-800-LAWYERS”) or numbers that are easy to 
remember (such as 1-800-333-3333). To gain an advantage on competitors, RespOrgs may 
engage in “warehousing” or “hoarding” of desirable numbers. “Warehousing” is the practice of 
claiming a number from the database without a customer request, in the hope of eventually luring 
a customer interested in a particular number.5 Similarly, “hoarding” occurs when a RespOrg 
claims more toll-free numbers than it intends to use, either to have ready stock available or to 
deny certain numbers to competitors.6 Both strategies are unsurprising when the government 
makes a key, but scarce, input available for free. But they are problematic, as they tie up limited 
resources unproductively and lead to quicker exhaustion of the limited supply of numbers per 
toll-free area code.  
 
In the past, the Commission has tried to curtail these practices through regulation. Commission 
rules prohibit both warehousing and hoarding by RespOrgs.7 The Commission has also prohibits 
number brokering, the selling of a toll-free number by a private entity for a fee.8 Instead, when a 
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customer cancels service, the toll-free number must be returned to the database for reassignment. 
When a new toll-free area code is first opened, the Commission has imposed strict daily limits on 
the quantity of telephone numbers each RespOrg may register, to increase the likelihood that 
popular numbers will be equitably distributed.9 
 
But regulation is an imperfect solution. The rules require costly monitoring and enforcement 
efforts, such as validating that each RespOrg request is on behalf of an actual subscriber, and 
bringing cases against suspected number brokers. Some commentators have called the 
effectiveness of these measures into question. For example, one law review article notes the 
persistent rumor that, despite the brokering ban, MCI supposedly paid a large sum to a broker to 
secure 1-800-COLLECT for its collect-calling business.10 Indeed, the Commission notes that “it 
takes little effort to find toll free numbers advertised for sale. An Internet search for ‘toll free 
numbers for sale’ produces numerous options to presumably buy and sell toll free numbers, as do 
online auction sites for ‘toll free number.’”11 
 
Moreover, these regulations do not address rent-seeking behavior by RespOrgs or the risk of 
inefficient number assignment. For example, many RespOrgs monitor the database continuously 
in the hope of noticing the moment a popular number becomes available. Moreover, certain 
RespOrgs have invested in enhanced access to the database, at least in part to quickly reserve 
desirable numbers.12 Both investments are inefficient, as RespOrgs dedicate resources to gaming 
the assignment system rather than pursuing productive activity. More generally, the system relies 
upon either a first-in-time rule or (in the case of new area codes) a quasi-lottery system in the 
hope a particular number will go to the subscriber that values it most. But getting to the database 
a fraction of a second faster than competitors, or winning a random drawing, may not be the best 
proxy for valuing the number. In other words, it is possible – even likely – that the current 
distribution mechanism assigns numbers to subscribers other than those that value those numbers 
most. This is, by definition, an inefficient allocation of a scarce resource, which cannot be 
remedied by aftermarket transactions because of the Commission’s prohibition on resale. 
 
III. Implementing Coase’s Solution 
 
A. Auctioning Popular Numbers 
 
At the September Open Meeting, the Commission will vote upon an innovative solution to this 
dilemma.13 This Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was sparked by the need to create a 
new toll-free area code, 833. In anticipation of the introduction of this new area code, the 
Commission asked RespOrgs to submit a pre-request for up to 2000 individual preferred 
numbers. From these submissions, the Commission determined there were approximately 17,000 
numbers requested by multiple RespOrgs – including at least 10 that 65 or more RespOrgs 
requested.14 
 
The Commission proposes using an auction rather than a lottery or a first-come, first-served 
system to assign those numbers requested by multiple RespOrgs. Specifically, the NPRM 
recommends allocating each number via a single-round, sealed-bid Vickrey Action. For each 
contested number, the auctioneer would solicit a single, confidential bid from each interested 
RespOrg. The highest bidder wins the number, and pays the amount of the second-highest bid. 
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Numbers that did not solicit interest from multiple RespOrgs would be assigned via the 
traditional first-come, first-served mechanism. 
 
There are multiple advantages to using this system to allocate popular toll-free numbers. First 
and foremost, an auction helps assure that each number goes to the subscriber that values it most. 
As Coase explained, the price mechanism helps the Commission discover the value that each 
interested party places upon a scarce resource, in this instance, a particular toll-free number. By 
assigning the number to the RespOrg (and therefore, presumably, the subscriber) willing to pay 
the most for it, the Commission can maximize the likelihood that the number will go to its 
highest and best use. Prices are the way we allocate most scarce resources in American society, 
and there’s no reason why toll-free numbers are any different than any other resource in that 
regard, except that they happen to be owned by the government. 
 
Relatedly, the auction design deters strategic bidding. Because the winner pays the second-
highest bid, the winner’s surplus (the difference between what it was willing to pay and what it 
actually paid for the asset) does not depend upon the winner’s bid, but that of the next-highest 
bidder. This generally encourages each interested RespOrg to place a bid that reflects its actual 
valuation of the number, rather than its attempt to predict a value slightly higher than its 
competitor’s bid.15 
 
Third, the auction discourages strategic behavior by RespOrgs. Because each RespOrg must “put 
its money where its mouth is,” it has less incentive to warehouse or hoard numbers for which it 
has no buyer. Warehousing and hoarding are attractive strategies largely because the 
Commission offered the numbers for free, which means the strategies offer potential gain for 
little or no cost. By placing a price tag on each number, the Commission makes these strategies 
more costly (because warehoused or hoarded numbers tie up valuable capital) and therefore less 
likely. 
 
Fourth, the auction conserves the Commission’s limited resources. The single-round auction is 
much cheaper than a traditional multi-round auction, meaning the upfront administrative costs of 
the auction are minimal. And because prices deter strategic behavior, the Commission will need 
fewer resources dedicated to ongoing enforcement mechanisms such as monitoring to prevent 
warehousing and hoarding. In an era of declining administrative budgets, it makes sense for the 
agency to rely on market forces when possible to help combat strategic behavior. 
 
Finally, and relatedly, the auction raises revenue. The Commission proposes to use the auction 
proceeds to help defray the costs of administering the toll-free numbering plan.16 Perhaps the 
amount raised may not be significant. But given that these administrative costs are a necessary 
expense to maintain toll-free numbering, it makes sense to use the auction to shift at least some 
of those costs to the subscribers who benefit most from the service. 
 
B. Prior Auction Experience 
 
Although auctioning toll-free numbers is a new initiative at the Commission, it is not without 
precedent. The NPRM notes that the Australian Communications and Media Authority auctioned 
1.8 million unreleased toll-free numbers between 2005 and 2015.17 According to the agency’s 
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report, the most desirable numbers in the pool were sold in highly competitive auctions, raising 
$17.6 million in the first year alone for the first 10,339 numbers.18 Unsurprisingly, the most 
valuable numbers were numbers that spelled out memorable words. The highest bid, topping $1 
million, was for 138 294, which translated to the phoneword “13 TAXI”.19 But after the first few 
years, auction activity dropped off, and many numbers left in the pool were uncontested and 
ultimately sold for the auction reserve price.20 The Commission surmises from the Australian 
experience that the auction was best deployed as a sorting mechanism for contested numbers. In 
contrast to the Australian design, the Commission proposes giving uncontested numbers away on 
a first-come, first-served basis rather than charging a single bidder a reserve price, so as to 
deploy as many numbers into the marketplace as quickly as possible. 
 
And, of course, this is not the Commission’s first experience with auctions. The agency faced 
many of these similar issues when wrestling with how to allocate another scarce communications 
input that it manages, namely the spectrum. Indeed, Coase leveled his 1959 broadside 
specifically at the agency’s practice of allocating spectrum licenses to broadcasters via 
comparative hearings rather than auctions or some other pricing mechanism. Beginning in 1982, 
the Commission allocated some non-broadcast spectrum licenses via lottery – a system similar to 
the current system for initially allocating popular toll-free numbers to RespOrgs when a new area 
code is opened.  
 
But the distorted incentives made the lottery system unworkable. The Commission’s inability, or 
unwillingness, to regulate license transfer, and the low upfront cost to participate in the lottery, 
caused the FCC to be deluged with applications every time a lottery was announced. Many 
participants had no desire to use the spectrum themselves, but instead sought a chance to secure a 
government asset for free that could then be resold for a significant sum. Congress ultimately 
stripped the Commission of lottery authority in 1997, forcing the agency instead to allocate such 
licenses via auction. Notably, because of the secondary market, it was likely that these spectrum 
licenses ultimately went to the user that valued it most. But using an auction meant that the value 
went to the U.S. Treasury rather than the lucky lottery winner. Since 1997, the Commission has 
successfully used auctions to free wide swaths of spectrum for next-generation communications 
purposes – most recently with the pending broadcast incentive auction – while recovering 
billions of dollars for taxpayers. 
 
C.  Lifting Prohibitions on the Secondary Market  
 
Perhaps equally importantly, the proposed NPRM recommends lifting the existing ban on trading 
toll-free numbers on the secondary market.21 As noted above, currently a subscriber that wishes 
to cancel toll-free service must surrender the number back to the database for reassignment on a 
first-come, first-served basis. This system perpetuates the inefficiencies of the current command-
and-control regime, such as destructive competition among RespOrgs for better database access, 
and the likelihood that the number would be reassigned to an entity other than the one that values 
it most. 
 
The Commission could, of course, correct these problems by auctioning numbers anew once they 
become eligible for reassignment. This solution is preferable to the current system for the 
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reasons listed above. But if the goal is to use price to guide numbers to those who most value 
them, it is suboptimal to insert the government into the transaction as a middleman. 
 
The Commission notes significant potential benefits to allowing customers to sell toll-free 
numbers at market prices. The right to resell allows the number to be considered an asset of the 
subscriber. So if, for instance, a business is sold to a new buyer, the buyer could elect to purchase 
the business’s existing toll-free number in addition to the other inputs of the operation.22 
Similarly, if a business that owns a popular toll-free number falls into bankruptcy, the court 
could permit sale of the number to help compensate creditors. More generally, allowing resale 
provides incentives for existing toll-free number holders to transfer the asset to someone who 
values it more. Company A may value its existing toll-free number at $20,000. Company B, with 
a different business model, may be willing to pay $40,000 for that number, because of the greater 
effect the number would have on Company B’s operations. It is better for society if the number 
shifts to Company B. But if, as now, Company A has no incentive to agree to the transfer, it will 
keep the toll-free number itself, which is a suboptimal allocation of public resources. The right of 
resale makes it easier for toll-free numbers to flow to their highest and best use. 
 
The potential for resale could also boost initial auction prices. If the business fails, the holder of 
the toll-free number knows that he or she might cut losses by selling the number as one of the 
firm’s assets. This makes the number more valuable, and therefore at the margin, could increase 
the price the business is willing to pay for the number at the outset. In this way, the government 
can capture a greater share of the value of the toll-free database.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In his landmark work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn uses Nicolaus 
Copernicus to explain how new ideas change scientific thinking. From ancient times, he 
explains, astronomers believed Ptolemy’s view that the sun orbited in a perfect circle around the 
Earth. But as instruments got better and the sun did not behave as predicted, scientists began 
tinkering with the model to match their observations. Perhaps the sun doesn’t move in a circle, 
but an ellipse. No, wait. Perhaps it is moving in little circles while completing its elliptical orbit, 
like a corkscrew. Eventually, science relied upon so many “epicycles upon epicycles” to make 
the data fit the theory that Copernicus found it easier just to upend the model. The reason the 
data doesn’t match the theory was because the sun does not orbit the earth, but the other way 
around. 
 
One can level the same critique at the FCC’s command-and-control model. Strict daily limits on 
allocation, coupled with a monitoring regime to deter warehousing and hoarding, plus an 
expensive and somewhat ineffective prohibition on brokering, are all regulatory epicycles upon 
epicycles. They are not necessary regulatory tweaks, but rather evidence that the dominant 
paradigm is broken. Like Copernicus, Ronald Coase offered an alternative market-based model 
that better fit society’s goals, one that has gained traction over time and improved both the 
agency and the industry that it oversees.  
 
The Toll-Free Assignment Modernization proposal may seem mundane, especially after such a 
high-profile flurry of FCC activity over the last several months. But the fact that it seems 
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mundane is strong evidence of how far the agency has come since Coase first critiqued it back in 
1959. 
 
While more work remains to be done, market-oriented reforms have helped make the 
communications marketplace more efficient and more innovative. These reforms ultimately 
benefit the American public. This month’s proposed NPRM to auction toll-free numbers is 
another, momentous reform in the right direction. 
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, an Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, is a Member 
of the Free State Foundation’s Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an 
independent, nonpartisan free market-oriented think tank located in Rockville, Maryland. 
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